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Torture After Nuremburg: US Law and Practice
Elizabeth Rapaport

1.

Introduction
The torture accusation was leveled at the George W. Bush
Administration throughout its conduct of the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT).1 The Administration vacillated between strained denials that it
tortures and admissions that we do resort to torture when necessary to
confound our terrorist enemies. The Administration, however, consistently
maintained that the “enhanced interrogation techniques” 2 employed in the
CIA interrogation “program”3 to which “high value”4 Al Qaeda prisoners
have been subjected is legal.5 The Administration may have admitted to
torture and other cruel treatment, but if so, the necessary corollary was that
torture, at least CIA torture authorized by the President, is lawful.
In this essay I will argue that the signature methods of interrogation
used by CIA and military interrogators in the GWOT - “torture lite”
techniques such as hypothermia and stress positions - may constitute torture,
but that the question of their legality under U.S, and international law is not
as straightforward as some critics of the Bush Administration maintained. I
will take up only one thread in the complex discussion of GWOT
interrogation practices and law, that of the boundary between torture and
lesser cruelty.
The prevailing critique of Bush interrogation policies on the part of
figures in past administrations and some in his own administration, as well as
media and academic critics, was that Bush‟s interrogation policies violate
U.S. torture and war crimes statutes, our treaty commitments under the
Convention Against Torture and the Geneva Conventions. 6 As a member of
the party of humanity, American branch, I share the goal of banning torture
with those brothers and sisters I will call, collectively, Bush‟s conventional
critics. In my view, however, the conventional critics have failed to
acknowledge the depth and extent of the failure of the United States and
other democratic nations to vindicate the Nuremburg aspiration of banning
torture. The excesses of the George W. Bush Administration should not be
allowed to obscure the status quo ante: Torture has been accommodated in
both law and practice from the Cold War to the GWOT. Pre- 9-11 law, like
more recent legislation, accommodated the use of modern torture doctrine
developed by the CIA.7 These practices are misleadingly denominated
“torture lite.”
The signal differences between the Bush administration and its
predecessors was a new if ambivalent candor about what we do and the
corruption of military law, which had previously adhered to the Geneva
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conventions.8 For, as we shall see, U.S. war crimes legislation enacted to
punish violations of Geneva standards was more stringent prior to the G.W.
Bush than was either international or U.S. torture law. It is also true that the
George W. Bush Administration interpreted and reformed U.S. law so that it
is friendlier to torturers; U.S. law is therefore worse than before from the
standpoint of the party of humanity. But, if all vestiges of the George W.
Bush era were extirpated from our law and we returned to the status quo
ante, U.S. law would continue to accommodate torture lite on the part of
clandestine services like the CIA, although not on the part of the military.
Nor is the U.S. unique among robust democracies in so doing.
This essay aims to overcome the amnesiac tendencies of the
conventional critics by reintegrating the modern history of torture and torture
legislation into our understanding of the tasks that confront the party of
humanity. While the George W. Bush Administration was at times flagrant
where its predecessors were sly, pre-9-11 law, like more recent legislation,
accommodates the use of the modern interrogation doctrine developed by the
CIA. These practices are often referred to as “torture light”(or “lite”) or
“psychological torture.”
Torture lite, as we shall see, was not developed to diminish or limit
suffering but rather to enhance efficiency in its employment. The trick on
which the law pivots is to define torture so that torture lite is classified as
lesser cruelty, which, while condemned, is not subject to the severe criminal
penalties or opprobrium that confront the practice of the type of torture
identified with the medieval rack and wheel or more contemporary methods
of breaking bones and rending flesh. Torture lite is nonetheless torture. Or,
more accurately and completely, torture lite comprises practices that can be
and are applied in a manner that satisfies the legal definition of torture
despite the slight of hand manipulations that seek to deflect this conclusion.
Moreover, old-fashioned heavy torture has never been entirely abandoned. It
is can be found in the annals of the CIA GWOT interrogation practice, and in
the rendering of prisoners to Governments that practice torture by both the
George W. Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration that
preceded it, and in US interventions in, for example, Central and South
America and in Vietnam.9 Throughout the public discussion of the GWOT
era practices, there has been amnesiac failure of reference to law and practice
before the Global War on Terrorism and the record that peers such as the
British and Israelis have compiled without benefit of George W. Bush.
Looking at the big picture, our collective problem is not that we veered away
from the road taken at Nuremburg, but rather that, with the exception of the
military, who were traveling that highway long before Nuremburg, we never
got on the bus.
2.

The Definition of Torture in Contemporary International Law
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The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CAT)10 is among the first
international agreements prohibiting torture that defines the term;11 it supplies
the most widely accepted legal definition of torture, a definition that has been
adopted as a model for other international agreements and in the domestic
law of nations, including that of the United States. The United States Senate
consented to the CAT subject to certain reservations, understandings and
declarations in 1990, and the instrument of ratification was deposited in
1994. The CAT is generally regarded as expressing norms of customary
international law, and indeed, jus cogens norms. CAT distinguishes between
torture and lesser cruelties.
Torture is defined as,
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising from legal sanctions. 12
There are four principal predicates or requirements in the CAT definition;
“severe pain or suffering,” “intentional infliction,” “purposes” and state or
“public” action.
For my purposes, “severe pain and suffering” and “purposes” are the
predicates upon which to focus attention. As to the purposes enumerated, the
sole purpose for which torture has any constituency in the contemporary
United States at present is interrogation to prevent future national security
harms, or garnering “actionable intelligence” 13 in the parlance of spokesmen
for Bush Administration Global War on Terror. The scope of the following
discussion will therefore be limited to the subject of interrogative torture for
the purpose of preventing future national security harms. The elucidation of
the standard “severe,” and the distinction between severe and lesser pain or
suffering would be critical to a determination of whether the United States
has practiced torture in courts throughout the world, including our own.
The CAT also bans, but does not define, “cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture.” The
CAT ban on torture is nonderogable:
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No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of
war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of
torture.14
By contrast, the CAT does not denominate cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment nonderogable.
The CAT obliges parties to ensure that “all acts of torture are
offences under its criminal law.” 15 Parties to CAT are also obliged to
prosecute, or extradite for prosecution elsewhere, persons who commit
torture. Parties to the CAT are required thereby to “prevent” but not to
criminalize cruelties not rising to the level of torture, although the practice of
such cruelty is derogable. The United States ratified the CAT subject to
certain stipulated reservations and understandings as to the definitions of
“torture” and “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.” These revised
definitions were employed in the domestic enabling legislation criminalizing
torture.16 These revisions are also employed in the definitions in U.S. war
crimes legislation,17 legislation the U.S. enacted in fulfillment of our
obligations as a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.18 The George W.
Bush era Detainee Treatment and Military Commissions Acts that amend the
Torture Statute and the War Crimes Act rely upon the same seminal revisions
of CAT definitions employed in the amended legislation.
3.

Legal and Illegal Coercion in U.S. Law
Neither CAT nor U.S. municipal law equates all coercion with
torture or other cruelty. There are in effect three levels of coercive
interrogation recognized in United States law, of which the first is legal and
the third is equated with heavily sanctioned felonies: (1) legal coercion , (2)
violations of constitutional standards for the treatment of persons in state
custody, and (3) torture. At the first level we find legitimate police
interrogation practices. The third level is synonymous with such serious
felonies as aggravated assault, murder and the crime of torture. At the second
level we find conduct that the CAT treats as CID and requires to be prevented
but not to be criminalized; level 2 acts may rise to civil wrongs,
misdemeanors or even felonies under U.S. law.
U.S. law of interrogation is premised on the supposition that to be
questioned in police custody is to be subject to coercion. 19 The law of
custodial interrogation requires that the suspect be advised of his or her
rights, including the rights to remain silent and to legal counsel, in order to
counteract this structural oppression and to prevent the overbearing of the
suspect‟s will. While notice of these rights and their exercise serve to guard
against a suspect‟s being forced to make admissions against his will, the
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Constitution permits the police to exploit their domination of the suspect in
custody - up to a point.
The law permits police to conduct sustained, intense interrogations
but does not permit more than minimal incursions on normal expectations of
eating or sleeping, nor may police assault their suspects. Police are permitted
to lie and to trick suspects, e.g., “your confederates have confessed,” or “we
have all the evidence we need to convict.” They are permitted to paint a
picture of the grim consequences of conviction but not to threaten physical
harm or reprisals.
Levels 2 and 3 are prohibited under both international and U.S. law,
but level 2 coercion is unlikely to be prosecuted as a heinous crime with
severe penalties in the United States or other countries that have embraced
the CAT. The CAT does not oblige ratifying nations to prosecute for level 2
offenses, and unlike torture, CID is derogable in emergencies.
Media reports have described GWOT interrogation practices that
arguably satisfy the definition of torture in international and domestic law. 20
These reports encompass cases of conduct that clearly satisfy any legal
definition of torture, e.g., beating a prisoner to death, 21 and conduct which
may not be severe enough to merit that designation, e.g., hooding. Recently,
Bush Administration officials admitted the use of waterboarding by the CIA
against three Al Qaeda prisoners in 2002 and 2003.22 It can‟t creditably be
denied that subjecting a prisoner to the fear of momentary death while he is
immobilized and suffocating is torture. There have also been documented
cases of the U.S. rendering and extraditing prisoners to governments who
practice torture.23
But what of the cruel practices known as torture lite about whose use
at Abu Ghairib, Bagram, Guantanmao and CIA blacksites we have been
reading almost since the inception of the GWOT, practices that the Bush
Administration denied are torture under U.S. or international law? Let us
look at some examples of these interrogation techniques employed during
the GWOT, at their Cold War provenance, and at something of the history of
their use by other democracies in the post-Nuremburg era of international
agreements to prohibit the use of torture.
4.

Some reported interrogation techniques employed in the
GWOT
One such technique is Cold Cell, used in the CIA interrogation of
Abu Zubadyah in the spring of 2002. The New York Times reports that,
At times, Mr. Zubaydah, still weak from his wounds, was
stripped and placed in a cell without a bunk or blankets. He
stood or lay on the bare floor, sometimes with air-conditioning
adjusted so that, one official said, Mr. Zubaydah seemed to
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turn blue.24

Other interrogation techniques, whose use has been authorized by the
Department of Defense or described in press accounts of authorized
interrogations, include heated cell, long standing, stress positions, hooding,
forced nudity, sexual humiliation, threats, sleep deprivation, and
waterboarding. The use of two of these techniques at Guantanamo was
described by an FBI agent in an intra-agency memo. The first of these is a
“stress position”:
On a couple of occasions, I entered interview rooms to find a
detainee chained hand and foot in a fetal position to the floor,
with no chair, food or water. Most times they had urinated or
defecated on themselves and had been left there for 18 24 (sic)
hours or more.
The second is “Heated Cell:”
On another occasion, the A/C had been turned off, making the
temperature in the unventilated room probably well over 100
degrees. The detainee was almost unconscious on the floor, with a
pile of hair next to him. He had apparently been literally pulling his
own hair out throughout the night. 25
It should be borne in mind that these techniques can be
employed repeatedly and in combination. Here is a description of
the interrogation of Mohammed al-Qahtani, believed to be the
twentieth hijacker in the 9/11/01 attacks:
Qahtani had been subjected to a hundred and sixty days of
isolation in a pen perpetually flooded with light, He was
interrogated on forty-eight of fifty-four days, for eighteen to
twenty hours at a stretch. He had been stripped naked;
straddled by taunting female guards, in an exercise called
“invasion of space by a female,” forced to wear women‟s
underwear on his head, to put on a bra; threatened by dogs,
placed on a leash; and told his mother was a whore. By
December, Qahtani had been subjected to a phony kidnapping,
deprived of heat, given large quantities of liquid without
access to a toilet, and deprived of sleep for three days… his
heart rate had dropped so precipitately, to thirty-five beats a
minute, that he required cardiac monitoring. 26
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C.I.A. Interrogation Doctrine27
The Holy Grail for both the CIA and the KGB in the early days of
the Cold War was a chemical method, a drug, which would eliminate a
subject‟s ability to resist and yet leave his or her mind sufficiently intact to
permit successful interrogation. Such programs failed in both East and West.
Medical and behavioral scientists next concentrated their efforts on
psychological torture. The goal remained mind control: If you can control the
subject‟s mind, why bother with the messy, unreliable business of breaking
his body? In the West, the CIA developed interrogation doctrine with the
critical assistance of the Canadians and the British. They were spurred on by
the precocious and proficient Soviet adversary, and incorporated admired
Soviet techniques.
The CIA and their collaborators recruited from the ranks of
academic scientists discovered that sensory deprivation and self-inflicted pain
are more effective at undermining resistance than physical assaults. Sensory
deprivation and self-inflicted pain are the alpha and omega of CIA
interrogation doctrine. In general, the proponents of torture lite adhere to the
view that interrogation succeeds by undermining the capacity for resistance
through inducing “regression”, i.e., weakness and dependency upon the
interrogator. From this perspective, pain inflicted by the interrogator can
stimulate and prolong resistance, while sensory deprivation and self inflicted
pain, together with the fear of physical harm rather than the experience of
brutality by captors, perhaps assisted by assaults on identity and sexual
humiliation, unravel the capacity to resist.28 The goal is not to limit or
moderate pain or suffering but to crush the will or ability to resist.
Among the iconic images of our time are the photographs of
prisoners at Abu Ghraib, posed nude or hooded, in stilted postures or naked
piles. One of these images is perhaps as familiar and recurrent as any image
of the post-9-11 era: A figure, presumably male, hooded, wearing a loose
rudimentary gown, stands on the top of an oblong box or device. There is
scarcely enough space on the small platform for his bare feet. His arms are
extended at a 45% angle. Wires extend from the fingers of his outstretched
hands. This image illustrates techniques of sensory deprivation and selfinflicted pain. Hooding or other sensory deprivations or manipulation of the
sensory environment through isolation, noise, heat or cold, can produce
profound, terrifying disorientation with astonishing rapidity. The figure on
the box is forced to stand in a “stress position.” How long can he maintain the
posture and endure the weight of his outstretched arms? Will current jolt his
body when he falters? This stress position is an application of self inflicted
pain, synergistically amplified by the hooding and draping: the subject,
disoriented, stripped of his social identity, is confronted not by an enemy to
loathe and resist but his own weakness.
Is torture lite to be ranked as lesser cruelty, as (mere) cruel, inhuman
5.
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or degrading treatment, or as torture? While at first blush relatively
innocuous compared to the flesh cutting, bone crushing practices in the
ancient and medieval worlds, torture lite and medieval torture have in
common that they are grounded in the best extant science for extracting
information without extinguishing the life or reason of the subject before he
or she reveals what the interrogator wants to learn. Torture lite was
understood by its CIA and KGB inventors to be an advance in efficiency, not
humanity, and in the case of the CIA, operating as agents of a democracy, to
be an ingenious way of getting on with the job at hand without, arguably,
violating international and domestic law. 29 These techniques are designed to
overcome the resistance of the most committed, brave and well trained
subjects. In this regard torture lite is the functional equivalent of medieval
torture. The CAT definition of torture does not invoke the unendurable, that
which overcomes the most stalwart will, but rather the degree or severity of
pain or suffering. One dimension of assessment of severity is the long term
effect upon those subjected to sensory deprivation and stress positions, a
question one need not ask about torture heavy. We will have ample
opportunity over the coming decades to study the long-term effects of torture
lite. As to the pain or suffering caused by the application of torture lite in
situ, it is reasonable to conclude that it could constitute either CID or torture
depending upon circumstances. Thus, to place a naked healthy man in a cold
cell overnight might not produce sufficient pain or suffering to reach the
torture threshold, but to place a naked wounded man from whom medical
treatment is withheld, or, for that matter, a healthy man, in a cold cell for
weeks would constitute torture. Sustained application of a technique like cold
cell, much less its concatenation with the sustained use of other techniques,
such as isolation, relentless noise, stress positions, food and sleep
deprivation, and long bouts of interrogation, would produce severe pain or
suffering, at least as the terms “severity” is ordinarily understood. Media
reports about Guantanamo and CIA blacksite interrogations establish that the
sustained concatenation of torture lite techniques have been inflicted on Al
Qaeda prisoners. If this is the commonsense understanding, what then is the
legal understanding of the level of coercion at which we are to peg torture
lite?
6.

Torture and CID in the Post-Nuremburg Law and Practice of
Other Contemporary Democracies
Two seminal cases, arising out of the conflict in Northern Ireland
and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, respectively in the European Court of in
Human Rights30 in 1978 and the Israeli Supreme Court31 in 1999, have
addressed the issue of whether at least some of the types of interrogation
techniques employed in the GWOT constitute torture or are otherwise illegal
under municipal and international law. Neither court found that these
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practices constituted torture. The European Court of Human Rights held that
the practices in question were cruel, inhuman and degrading, and as such
violated the European Convention on Human Rights, but were not torture.
The practices challenged and held to be CID but not torture were:
(a) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for
periods of some hours in a 'stress position,' described by
those who underwent it as being 'spreadeagled against the
wall, with their fingers put high above the head against the
wall, the legs spread apart and the feet back, causing them
to stand on their toes with the weight of the body mainly on
the fingers';
(b) hooding: putting a black or navy coloured bag over the
detainees' heads and, at least initially, keeping it there all
the time except during interrogation;
(c) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations,
holding the detainees in a room where there was a
continuous loud and hissing noise;
(d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations,
depriving the detainees of sleep;
(e) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees
to a reduced diet during their stay at the centre and pending
interrogations.
As noted in the famous August 1, 2002 U.S. Justice Department
Memorandum32 (known as “the torture memo”), the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) relied on the distinction made by the European
Convention on Human Rights, which parallels that of the CAT, between
severity or intense cruelty and lesser cruelty, as the demarcation between
torture and CID. The memo takes note that some of the detainees were
“beaten severely” and then forced into the wall standing position, some were
”continuously kicked” while wall standing and some of these beatings
produced “massive injuries.” To understand the decision of the ECHR about
the intensity or severity of suffering required to reach the level of torture one
must bear in mind the high ceiling assigned to mere CID in the Ireland
decision. These men were not subjected to a single application of one of these
methods, but to sustained reiterations and combinations of them. At least
some were subjected to old fashion assault in order to enhance the impact of
the more innovative ministrations of their interrogators.
The Israeli Supreme Court subsequently held in 1999 that five
interrogation methods employed by the General Security Service„s (GSS or
Shabach) violated Israeli law. The Supreme Court did not find that these
methods constituted torture under Israeli and international law, and indeed
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did not even consider that possibility. The Supreme Court also held that
although these methods are illegal, a necessity defense was available to GSS
interrogators who used them if the national security circumstances were
grave. If indeed these methods do not constitute torture, then, under the CAT
at least, their use in emergency circumstances might be consistent with
international law. Only torture is nonderogable under the CAT.33
The five methods challenged and held to violate Israeli law were:
1. Shaking - the forceful shaking of the suspect‟s upper torso,
back and forth, repeatedly, in a manner which causes the neck
and head to dangle and vacillate rapidly.
2. The “Shabach” (GSS) Position34 - “He is seated on a small
and low chair, whose seat is tilted forward, towards the ground.
One hand is tied behind the suspect, and placed inside the gap
between the chair‟s seat and back support. His second hand is
tied behind the chair, against its back support. The suspect‟s
head is covered by an opaque sack, falling down to his
shoulders. Powerfully loud music is played in the room.”
3. Frog Crouch - This refers to consecutive, periodical crouches
on the tips of one‟s toes, each lasting for five minute intervals.
4. Sleep Deprivation
5. Excessive Tightening of hand and ankle cuffs
The similarities shared by British and Israeli methods and those of
the CIA point to their origins in Cold War interrogation science. The history
of U.S. law also reveals a like exploitation of a capacious definition of CID to
protect torture lite and those who employ it from opprobrium and criminal
liability. President George W. Bush and Administration spokesmen
indignantly insisted that, although we are necessarily harsh in interrogating
terror suspects, we do not practice torture. Their point was that we eschew
medieval torture.35 However, it was conceded that that torture lite techniques
were practiced and constitute at least CID.36 In this regard the United States
followed the path already taken by Europe and Israel, although the Bush
Administration broke new ground by corrupting military law. Let us look at
the history of the reception of international legal standards governing the
conduct of interrogations into U.S. law, and in particular, the distinction
between torture and CID in U.S. law.
7.
History of U.S. Torture Law
A. Dueling Definitions of Torture in U.S. Law
In December 2004 the Department of Justice repudiated the definition of
torture in the notorious “torture memo,” leaked earlier that year. The earlier
memo had narrowed the definition of torture previously uniformly employed
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to explicate the meaning of torture in U.S. law and in treaties into which the
United States entered in the post-Nuremburg world. The 2004 memo
superceded the 2002 memo “in its entirety” but it took aim expressly at its
narrow definition of torture: “excruciating or agonizing pain” or pain
“equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury,
such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.” The
superceding 2004 memo reminds us that under CAT and US law as
previously understood, severe suffering, mental, as well as physical,
constitutes torture; mutilation or death dealing assault are not the sole
inhabitants of this category.37 The newer memo returns to the definitional
strategy of the Reagan and first Bush Administration, adopted by the Clinton
Administration, which oversaw the deposit of the instrument of ratification of
CAT and the passage of the Torture Statute. That strategy employs the
common sense understanding of “severity” of pain or suffering as the
demarcation between torture and lesser forms of cruelty. The Department of
Justice lawyers who were proponents of the 2004 memo deserve recognition
for combating the blatant endorsement of torture represented by the 2002
memo. However, reversion to the law produced in keeping with the
ratification strategy is not sufficient to satisfy Nuremburg aspirations for a
law that bans torture.
B. The Definitions of Torture and CID in CAT as Ratified
The Reagan Administration unsuccessfully sought Senate approval
of the CAT in 1988.38 The G. H. W. Bush Administration won Senate
approval in 1990, subject to a revised and augmented package of
reservations, understandings and declarations, including revision of the
definitions of torture and CID in the treaty. 39 It was ratified in 1994, during
the Clinton Administration, which also saw passage of the requisite
implementing legislation, the Torture Statute. 40 The avowed purpose of
narrowing the definition of torture in the CAT was to interpret the term
“torture” in the CAT in a fashion “corresponding to the common
understanding of torture,” which reserves the term for “extreme, deliberate,
and unusually cruel practices.”41 The Senate did not offer further refinement
of the concept of physical torture, but did offer guidance by way of examples
of physical torture: “sustained systematic beating, application of electric
shock to sensitive parts of the body, and tying up or hanging in positions that
cause extreme pain.”42
“Mental torture” was further defined to ensure that the severity
threshold was sufficiently high and the pain and suffering were objectively
manifest:
Mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from: (1) intentional infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2)
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the administration or application, or threatened administration,
of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat
of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will
imminently be subjected to death severe physical pain or
suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering
substances calculated to disrupt the senses or personality.43

Having addressed the need for a stringent understanding of torture,
it remained to distinguish between CID and lawful police procedures. The
“cruel, inhuman and degrading” language of CAT was deemed too vague to
delineate this boundary: conduct lawful under the US Constitution might be
construed as CID absent clarification. Citing a 1977 European Commission
of Human Rights case in which official failure to recognize “an individual‟s
[desire for] change of sex” was held to be degrading treatment as an example
of a broader understanding of CID than that required by U.S. law, 44 the U.S.
ratified subject to the understanding that CID means conduct “prohibited by
the Fifth, the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.”45
The Ireland case predates Reagan Administration‟s referral to the
Senate in 1988 by 10 years. Yet there is no discussion of the techniques of
sensory deprivation or stress positions classified as CID by the European
Court of Human Rights in Ireland. The Report of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations recommending ratification in 1990 is equally silent.
Nowhere in these official submittals and reports is the curtain lifted on the
covert science developed by the CIA. CIA science, as practiced by the United
States and her allies, the subject matter of Ireland, remained cloaked. The
inference that this negative record invites is that that the drafters of U.S.
torture law relied upon Ireland‟s conclusions about Cold War interrogation
doctrine. They defined CID expansively to encompass torture lite, but
preferred not to call attention to these techniques or this disheartening
enervation of human rights law. For once the nature of these techniques are
exposed, they pose a formidable challenge to the legal fictions that torture lite
is not torture and that torture has been banned. To this extent George W.
Bush followed the lead of Europe and preceding U.S. administrations: They
all balked at fulfilling the promise of Nuremburg.
8.

George W. Bush Administration Legislation: The Detainee
Treatment Act and The Military Commissions Act
The Geneva Conventions differ from the CAT in that both torture
and CID are nonderogable and that parties to the Geneva Conventions unlike
the CAT are required to criminalize both levels of cruelty. There is, therefore,
tension and lack of alignment between human rights and humanitarian law to
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this extent. Almost from the onset, the Bush Administration took the position
that the GWOT is “a new kind of war,”46 in which the jihadis with whom we
are engaged are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. 47
Further, the War Crimes Act, the enabling legislation the U.S. enacted to
comply with our obligations under the Geneva Conventions, differs from the
Torture Statute in that it provides severe penalties for CID, as does the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, the criminal code governing serving
military personnel. The taste for cruel interrogation methods could therefore
potentially have exposed Administration officials to criminal liability derived
from U.S. treaty commitments under the Geneva Conventions, even if the
CAT proved toothless. For under the law that Bush inherited, both military
and CIA interrogators were subject to the War Crimes Act, 48 and in the case
of military interrogators, the Uniform Military Code of Justice as well, both
of which impose the strictures of the Geneva Conventions regarding the
treatment of prisoners. The Administration received a stunning setback when
the Supreme Court held in 2006 that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions applied to Guantanamo detainees. 49 The outcome of the battle
over retention of Geneva standards in U.S. law is far from concluded at this
writing. The Administration suffered some reversals to its interrogation
policies with the passage of the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, also known at
the McCain Amendment after its eponymous sponsor, Senator John McCain,
but it also gained ground in that 2005 legislation as well as in the 2006
Military Commissions Act.
A. War Crimes in U.S. Law as Enacted in 1996
The law of war, or humanitarian law, as codified by the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, prohibits both torture and inhumane treatment of all
persons protected by the Conventions. Common Article 3, so called because
it appears verbatim as Article 3 in each of the four conventions, prohibits “at
any time and in any place”50
Violence to life or person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, taking of hostages,
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment;51
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld52 the US Supreme Court held that Common
Article 3 applies to our conflict with al Qaeda, thus vindicating the view,
championed by the Powell Department of State and the Armed Services,
that no person or class of persons is outside the protection of the Geneva
Conventions. The Court held that Common Article 3 applies to anyone who
is not otherwise protected under the Conventions who is “involved in a
conflict in the territory of a signatory.”53 Thus Al Qaeda prisoners, if not
deemed prisoners of war and protected as such, are nevertheless protected

14

Torture After Nuremburg

under Common Article 3. Common article 3 stipulates the minimal
protection owed to anyone by parties to the Conventions.
As parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the United States
was obligated to enact legislation that criminalizes "grave breaches of the
Conventions.54 In fulfillment of this obligation, the United States enacted
War Crimes Act in 1996. Grave breaches include:
Willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health. 55
Under both the Geneva Conventions and the War Crimes Act of 1996, both
torture and CID are grave offenses. Unlike the Torture Statute, the War
Crimes Act does not lend itself to the exploitation of the distinction between
torture and CID: The legal assimilation of egregious treatment of detainees
under interrogation to mere CID is not as promising a maneuver under this
parallel law which could be invoked against both civilian and military
officials.
The legal definitions of torture and CID employed in the War
Crimes Act enacted in 1996 and in subsequent Bush Administration
amendments to the Act are those devised by the Reagan and G. H. W. Bush
State Departments and incorporated in CAT as ratified. Torture is therefore
defined in the War Crimes Act as extreme cruelty and CID as conduct that
would violate the 5th, 8th or 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. If
mere CID is a war crime, then there is potential for liability for heinous
crimes by senior and field grade officials for interrogations employing torture
lite. The Bush Administration has sought to safeguard its interrogation
policies, their authors, and their agents through new legislation; its domestic
opponents have sought with limited success to keep the United States aligned
with the standards recognized in the Geneva Conventions.
B. GWOT Era Legislation: The Detainee Treatment Act and the
Military Commissions Act
In 2005 and 2006 respectively Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act56 (DTA) and the Military Commissions Act57 (MCA)
respectively. In the DTA and MCA, Senator McCain‟s bargain was to call a
halt to the corruption of the military but condone presidential authority to
order the CIA to use interrogation techniques forbidden to the military. The
DTA reveals the bifurcation in U.S. law between the legal constraints on
members of the military on the one hand and other U.S. agents. The DTA
prohibits the Department of Defense from subjecting any person in its
custody to any interrogation technique not authorized by the Army Field
Manual.58 The manual, as revised in 2006, continues to impose traditional
strict adherence to Geneva standards. 59 For the military, CID, like torture, is
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prohibited. Senator McCain‟s accomplishment in the DTA is the
reaffirmation of the military‟s commitment to the Geneva Conventions. This
achievement will give the military heart to attempt to resuscitate the law of
war and the culture that surrounded it before Bagram, Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo corrupted military law and practice.
The DTA also expressly quelled the position taken by the Bush
Administration that CAT Article 16, required the prevention of CID only
within the United States.60 This Administration position was arrived at by
adducing from the fact that the U.S ratified CAT subject to the understanding
that CID meant conduct prohibited by the US Constitution that the U.S. was
obliged to prevent CID only where the Constitution was in force.61 The DTA
repudiated this position; not jurisdiction, but standards of treatment are at
issue: No one in U.S. custody anywhere in the world may be subject to CID.
Despite its express prohibition of CID by any U.S. agents any where
in the world, the DTA accommodated CIA CID: It enacted a good faith
defense for interrogators who employ officially authorized interrogation
methods that constitute CID,62 and enacted measures, strengthened in the
MCA, that severely constrict detainees‟ ability to find redress in federal
courts.63 Most significantly for the inquiry at hand, the MCA gives the
president authority to determine whether a particular torture lite technique
forbidden to the military may be legally employed by the CIA.
In the Military Commissions Act the theme of a law too vague for
practical application, previously heard when the Senate ratified the CAT
subject to certain understandings, is heard once more. This time, it is the
imprecision of the War Crimes Act that calls for redefinition or refinement.
Under the War Crimes Act prior to amendment by the MCA, any grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions, including CID, would subject officials to
the possibility of prosecution for a serious felony. The War Crimes Act as
amended by the MCA enumerates grave breaches of common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and assigns to the President the authority to determine
offenses not grave. 64 Thus, with an interrogation technique not enumerated,
whether it be from the repertoire of torture lite, hyperthermia perhaps, or a
technique like waterboarding that looks more like torture heavy, it is for the
President to determine whether its use is legitimate or whether its use
constitutes a Geneva violation and a war crime. An official who relied upon a
presidential order, bolstered by a Department of Justice opinion that a
technique was lawful, would have a good faith defense. However,
hypothermia and other techniques in the torture lite repertoire remain crimes
if committed by serving military personnel subject to the Field Manual and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
C. The Evolution of the Fifth Amendment Test for CID: The Achilles Heel of
a Better Future for U.S. Law
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When the CAT was ratified, the standard for permissible
interrogation under CAT was pegged to the level of coercion tolerated by the
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. That
demarcation line between legal coercion and CID continues to inform The
Torture Statute, the War Crimes Act, and U.S. interpretations of her
international obligations. However, the test for legality in Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence has undergone a dramatic change in the direction of making it
easier to argue, plausibly, that torture lite techniques pass constitutional
muster.
When CAT was ratified, the Fifth Amendment demarcation was, as
it is today, established by judicial deployment of the “shocks the conscience”
test. That test was formulated in Rochin v. California.65 The case presented
the question of whether police use of an emetic to force a suspect to disgorge
swallowed narcotics was a substantive due process violation. The Court held
that it was because it “shocked the conscience.” Although vague and
uncertain from the inception - the sensibilities of judges could be expected to
vary appreciably - Rochin stood for the proposition that some government
conduct was absolutely beyond the pale whether or not the government
sought to introduce the evidence or confession so compelled into a court of
law.66 In Sacramento v. Lewis,67 the Court recast the shock the conscience
test as a balancing test, under which the interests of the state are weighed
against the injury inflicted on the person in custody. The Supreme Court
moved away from the long familiar bright-line version of the shock the
conscience test to an interpretation of the test under which the strength of
state need to impose pain or suffering informs the outcome of the test as well
as the quality and quantity of the injury inflicted. The reinterpreted test is
more congenial to arguments for the legality of the enhanced interrogation
program approved for use by the CIA. Indeed, there is reason to believe that
the Bush Administration looked to the new shock the conscience test for
support of the legality of torture lite: The Administration secured classified
opinions from the Department of Justice in 2005 that reportedly rely upon the
balancing test version of shock the conscience to justify torture lite and the
heavy torture practice of waterboarding:
Relying on a Supreme Court finding that only conduct that
“shocks the conscience” was unconstitutional, the [one of the
two secret 2005 Department of Justice opinions] opinion
found that in some circumstances not even waterboarding was
necessarily cruel, inhuman or degrading, if for example the
suspect was believed to possess crucial intelligence about a
planned terrorist attack…68
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Fortuitously, Sacramento invites the balancing of the safety of the nation
against the suffering of a terrorist suspect. Such unfettered utilitarian
calculation is alien not only to the Rochin version of the test, but utterly
inimical to the realization of the Nuremburg dispensation.
9.

Conclusion
The admission by high Administration officials that the CIA had
waterboarded three prisoners in 2002 and 2003 provided a “gotcha”
moment.69 After years of responding to the torture accusation by alternating
tough talk about doing whatever it takes to defend Americans with
unequivocal denials that we torture, the Bush Administration provided its
critics with the satisfaction of confession. In my view, the waterboarding
controversy is, if not a red herring, then a prime example, of what is wrong
with the discussion of GWOT torture in the United States. We did not need to
wait for an admission of waterboarding to vindicate the torture accusation.
Rather, we need to recognize that the routine practice of torture lite at
Bagram, Abu Ghairib, and Guantanamo and CIA blacksites was torture.
Next, we need to acknowledge that torture has proven irresistible to
democratic governments since Nuremburg. The party of humanity, therefore,
should seek to expose torture lite for what it is, and introduce into
international and municipal law explicit prohibitions of these practices as
torture and therefore nonderogable. There is nothing objectionable in
principle about the avowed Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton strategy of
seeking a categorical ban on the worst cruelty while conceding that a legal
regime capable of attracting broad support and compliance could not aim to
eliminate all state cruelty. This stance does not satisfy humanitarians who
believe that state cruelty can be routed altogether. Yet an honest legal ban on
torture would take us far beyond anything yet achieved.

Notes
1

See, for example, D Priest and B Gellman, „U.S. Decries Abuse but
Defends Interrogations „Stress and Duress‟ Tactics Used on Terrorism
Suspects held in Secret Overseas Facilities‟, Washington Post, December 26,
2002, p. A01, an early account of Defense Department and CIA interrogation
practices.
2
S Shane, D Johnston and J Risen, „Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe
Interrogations,‟ New York Times, October 3, 2007, p. A1.
3
ibid.
4
ibid.
5
„President Bush‟s Speech on Terrorism‟ [transcript] New York Times,
September 6, 2006, p.A1, confirmed that „an alternative set of procedures”

18

Torture After Nuremburg

was used to interrogate high value Al Qaeda prisoners at CIA secret prisons.
The President therein asserts that the Department of Justice has determined
that the “program” of alternative procedures “complied with our laws.”
6
See, for example, Harold Hongju. Koh, now Dean of Yale Law School, and
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the
Clinton Administration and a lawyer in the Office of Legal Counsel in the
Justice Department under President Reagan., „A World Without Torture,‟
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2005, pp. 641-62. “I had long
thought that United States law and policy are both clear and unambiguous.
Torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment are both illegal and
totally abhorrent to our values and constitutional traditions.” P. 643. In the
same article he recalls reporting to the UN Committee Against Torture,
acting in his official capacity, that the United States does not as a matter of
law or policy order or condone torture. He proceeds to criticize the “infamous
Department of Justice, August 1, 2002 memo arguing the legality of torture
as “the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read.” Pp. 646-7. Or,
see, Anthony Lewis, former New York Times columnist, castigating the
politically appointed radical lawyers who overrode the opposition of lawyers
and other officials in the military, Departments of State and Justice “who
wanted to carry on the American tradition of humane treatment of prisoners,”
„The Torture Administration,‟ The Nation, December 26, 2005.
7
AW McCoy, „A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, form the Cold War
to the War on Terror,‟ Henry Holt, New York, 2006, is an indispensable
contemporary work that recounts a history that has been frequently ignored
but is not unknown.
8
On the opposition of the Armed Services to abandoning the Geneva
Conventions, see for example, J Meyer, „The Memo, How an internal effort
to ban the abuse and torture of detainees was thwarted,‟ The New Yorker;
2/27/2006, Vol. 82 Issue 2, pp. 32-41.
9
M Satterthwaite & A Fisher, „Tortured Logic: Renditions to Justice,
Extraordinary Rendition, and Human Rights Law,‟ The Long Term View, vol.
6, pp 49-66 (2006).
10
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment (CAT), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984) (entered into force June 26,
1987).
11
Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on the
Convention Against Torture, testimony of Deputy Attorney General Mark
Richard, January 30, 1990, S. Hrg. 101-78, p. 16.
12
CAT, Article 1, op. cit. note 10.
13
See, for example, statement by President Bush, S G Stolberg, „Bush
Interrogation Methods aren‟t Torture, New York Times, October 5, 2007.
14
CAT, op cit., Articles 2 & 16.

Elizabeth Rapaport

15

19

CAT, Article 4.
18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340 (2000).
17
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
18
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. (Geneva
Conventions I-IV)
19
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, is the locus classicus of this
constitutional doctrine.
20
See, for example, M Bowden, „The Dark Art of Interrogation,‟ Atlantic
Monthly, October, 2003, pp. 51-76.
21
H Shamsi, D Perlstein (ed.), „Command Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in
Custody,‟ Human Rights First, Report, February,2006, retrieved 14 July
2008, <http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-rep-web.pdf.>
22
M Isikoff and M Hosenball, „The Truth Will Out,‟ Newsweek, February 6,
2008,http://www.newsweek.com/id/108719/output/print.
23
J Meyer, „Outsourcing Torture,‟ The New Yorker, Feb. 14, 2005, Vol 81,
Issue 1, pp. 106-23.
24
D Johnston, „At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over Tactics,‟ New
York Times, September 10, 2006, p. 1.
25
N A Lewis and D. Johnston, „New FBI Files Describe Abuse of Iraq
Inmates,‟ New York Times, December 21, 2004, p. A1.
26
J Mayer, The Memo, op. cit. note 8.
27
Throughout this section, I rely on A W McCoy‟s, „A Question of Torture:
CIA interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism,‟ op. cit. note
7. McCoy assembles information that has been available for decades, but has
nonetheless nearly vanished from national consciousness.
28
ibid., pp.50-52 and passim.. See also pp.90-91.
29
ibid.
30
Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.C.H.R. (Ser. A) (1978)
31
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 38 I.L.M.
1471 (1999).
32
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, August 1, 2002. <http://
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/>
33
Interest in possible defenses to charges of torture and war crimes against
16

20

Torture After Nuremburg

national security officials suffuses the August 1, 2202 Office of Legal
Counsel Memo, id.
34
The Israeli Court held expressly that the practice of hooding was
prohibited. If a detainee could not be physically separated from others with
whom interrogators wished to prevent contact, they could resort to covering
his eyes in a manner not harmful to the detainee. Hooding “suffocates” and
“degrades” the detainee.
35
See, for example, President Bush‟s statement, “I want to be absolutely clear
with our people and the world: The United States does not torture.,” President
Bush‟s Speech on Terrorism, op.cit. note 5.
36
For example, the CIA inspector general concluded in 2004 that ten of the
enhanced techniques authorized post-9-11 were CID under the CAT. D Jehl,
„Report Warned C.I.A. on Tactics in Interrogation,‟ New York Times,
November 9, 2005.
37
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice , Memorandum for
James B. Comey, Deputy Atty. General, from Daniel Levin, Acting Asst. Atty.
General, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A, Dec. 30,
2004. <http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm>
38
President‟s Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment of Punishment,
Summary and Analysis, May 23, 1988, S. Treaty Doc No. 100-20, reprinted
in 13857 U.S. Cong. Series(1990).
39
Senate Executive Report No. 101-30, 101st Cong., 2ns Sess., Report from
the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, August 30,
1990 (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).
40
18 U.S.C. §2340(a) (2000).
41
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, August 30,
1990, Exec. Report 101-30, p. 13-14.
42
ibid.
43
Ibid., p. 36
44
Ibid., pp. 25-6.
45
Ibid., p. 36.
46
Alberto E Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Memorandum for the
President, Decision re Application of the Geneva Conventions on Prisoners
of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, January 25, 2002.
47
President Bush, Order, Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees, February 7, 2002. The President declared that Al Qaeda, and
Taliban fighters were “unlawful combatants” and as such outside the
protections of the Geneva Conventions. He did, however, undertake to treat

Elizabeth Rapaport

21

detainees “humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.”
48
18 U.S.C.§ 2441 (2000).
49
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
50
Geneva Conventions (Gen Con.), Common Article 3.1
51
Gen. Con., Common Article 3.1 (a)-(c)
52
Hamdan, v. Rumsfeld, op. cit. note 58.
53
ibid., p. 2757.
54
Gen. Con. I, Article 49, Gen. Con. II, Article 50, Gen. Con. III, Article
129, Gen. Con. IV, Article, 146, op. cit. note 19.
55
Gen. Con. I, Article 50, Gen. Con. II, Article 51, Gen. Con. III, Article
130, Gen. Con. IV, Article 147, ibid.
56
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) (Pub. L. 109-148, Div. A,
Title X, Dec. 30, 2005, 119, Stat. 2739).
57
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Pub. L 109-366, Oct. 17, 2006, 120
Stat. 2006).
58
DTA § 1002 (a). op. cit. note 65.
59
Army Field Manual FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector
Operations (Sept. 2006) available at www.army.mil/institution/armypublic
affairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf.
The Field Manual forbids CID. It also expressly prohibits certain torture lite
techniques, including hooding or covering the eyes, privation of food, water
and medical care, forced nudity, performance or simulation of sexual acts,
and inducing hypothermia and heat injury.
60
DTA §1003(a), op. cit. note 65.
61
Abraham Sofaer, legal advisor to the State Department in the first Bush
Administration, and the official who presented the CAT to the Senate for
ratification for that Administration, explained in a letter to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary and in a letter to the Wall Street Journal
contemporaneous with the Senate confirmation hearings for Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales, that the Reagan and first Bush Administrations were
proposing that CID be understood to mean prohibited by the constitution not
a jurisdictional or geographical limitation. See letter from Abraham Sofaer
to Senator Patrick Leahy, Committee, (Jan. 21,2005), reprinted in 151 Cong.
Rec. S12382-83; Abraham D. Sofaer, „No Exceptions,‟ Wall Street Journal,
Nov. 26, 2005, A11.
62
DTA § 1004(a), op. cit. note 65. Further, the DTA exhibits the same
sensitivity to the need to insure that officials charged with torture or war
crimes will be able to avail themselves of legal defenses that we encountered
in the 2002 Department of Justice Memo. The DTA provides the President‟s
men and women and the CIA with a legal defense to a criminal or civil action
if he or she did not know the interrogation practice was illegal provided also

22

Torture After Nuremburg

that a person of “ordinary sense and understanding” would not know the
practice was illegal. Under the MCA, reliance on the advice of counsel “is an
important factor” in determining whether the official acted as a person of
ordinary sense and understanding would act.
63
DTA §(D) (3), op. cit. note 65.
64
MCA § 6, op. cit. note 66.
65
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
66
In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), a majority of the Supreme
Court so concluded.
67
523 U.S. 833 (1998).
68
S Shane, D Johnston and J Risen, „Secret Endorsement of Severe
Interrogations,‟ op. cit. note 2.
69
M Isikoff and M Hosenball, „The Truth Will Out,‟ op. cit. note 23.

Bibliography
Army Field Manual FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector
Operations (Sept. 2006) available at www.army.mil/institution/
armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf.
Bowden M., „The Art of Interrogation‟ Atlantic Monthly, October, 2003.
pp 51-76.
Bush G.W. „Speech on Terrorism‟ New York Times, September 6, 2006,
p.A1.
Bush G. W. President, Order, Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees, February 7, 2002.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment (CAT), 1465 U.N.T.S.85 (1984) (entered into force June
26, 1987).
Detainee Treattment Act of 2005(Pub. L. 109-148, Div A, Title X, Dec. 30,
2005,119, Stat. 2739).
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. (Geneva
Conventions I-IV)
Gonzales A. E., Counsel to President, Memorandum for the President,

Elizabeth Rapaport

23

Decision re Application of the Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of
War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, January 25,
2002.
Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
Isikoff M., Hosenball M., „The Truth Will Out,‟ Newsweek, February 6, 2008
http://www.newsweek.com/id/108719/output/print.
Johnston D., „At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared over Tactics,‟ New
York Times, September 10, 2006, p.1.
Koh H . H., „A World without Torture‟ Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law, 2005, pp 641-62.
Lewis, A, ‘The Torture Administration,’ (http://thenation.docprint.mhtml?i=
20051226&s=lewis) The Nation, December 8, 2005 (posted);
December 26, 2005(issue).
Lewis N.A., Johnston D., „New FBI Files Describe Abuse of Iraq Inmates,‟
New York Times, December 21, 2004, p. A1.
Martinez v. Chavez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
McCoy AW., ‘A question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, form the Cold War
to the War on Terror’, Henry Holt, New York, 2006.
Meyer J., „The Memo, How an internal effort to ban the abuse and torture of
detainees was thwarted,‟ The New Yorker, Vole 82, Issue 2,
February 27, 2006 pp. 32-41.
Meyer J., „Outsourcing Torture‟ The New Yorker, vol. 81,issue 1, Feb. 14,
2005, pp.106-123.
Military Commission Act of 2006(Pub. L. 109-336, Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat.
2006).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of
Conduct for Interrogation Under 15 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, Aug. 1,
2002 < http: //www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/>.
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for
James B. Comey, Deputy Atty. General, From Daniel Levin, Acting
Asst. Att. General, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C.
2340-2340A, Dec.30, 2004 <http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc
23402340a2.htm .>
President‟s Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment of
Punishment, Summary and Analysis, May 23,1988, S.Treaty Doc
No.100-20, reprinted in 13857 U.S. Cong Series (1990).
Priest D., Gellman B.,„ Stress and Duress‟ tactics used on terrorism suspects
held in secret overseas facilities‟ , Washington Post Dec. 26, 2002,
p a01.

24

Torture After Nuremburg

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 38 I.L.M. 1471
(1999)
Richard M. Deputy Attorney General, Testimony, Hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, on the Convention Against Torture,
S. Hrg. 101-78, January 30, 1990, p.16.
Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.C.H.R (Ser. A) (1978).
Satterthwaite A., Fisher A., „Tortured Logic: Renditions to Justice,
Extraordinary Rendition, and Human Rights Law,‟ The Long Term
View, vol 6, 2006, pp. 49-66.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, January 30, 1990, S. Hrg. 101-78.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report from the Committee on the on
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Executive Report No. 101-30,
101st Cong., 2ns Sess.August 30, 1990.
Shamsi H., Perlstein D., „Command Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in
Custody,‟ Human Rights First, Report, February, 2006 retrieved
July 24, 2008. http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06221-etn-hrfrep-web.pdf .
Shane S., Johnston D., Risen J., „Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe
Interrogations‟ New York Times, Oct. 3, 2007, p. A1.
Stolberg S.G., „Bush Interrogation Methods aren‟t Torture‟ New York Times,
October 5, 2007.
Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340 (2000).
War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 2441 (2000).

